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1. Introduction
In the last two decades the economics of information has become one of the major
areas of research. These ideas have been applied to the cooperative game theory
in recent years. In this paper we introduce asymmetric information and prove
the existence of an -core in the TU (Transferable Utility) game derived from an
incomplete information game.
The related work dates back to the article by Scarf (1971). He applied Shapley
and Shubik's (1969) approach to n-person normal form games. He derived the NTU
(Non Transferable Utility) game from an n-person normal form game, and veri.ed
the existence of an -core in the NTU-game. Wilson (1978) added the notion of
different information or uncertainty to this model and showed the same result.
Yannelis (1991) extended Wilson's model to the in.nitely many (continuum of) states,
and proved the non-emptiness of an -core under uncertainty.
In this paper we progress one step ahead of their results. We investigate an
incomplete information game instead of an n-person normal form game. In this
incomplete information game, each player has different information and a private
prior probability. One of the main contributions of our paper is to prove the
existence of an -core in the class of TU-games which are derived from incomplete
information games. This result is considered as an asymmetric information version of
Zhao (1999a).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In section
3 we prove our main results. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Definitions
Let us begin our analysis by describing an incomplete information game to be
employed in this paper.
DEFINITION 1 : An incomplete information game is a system (), where
(1) is the set of players,
(2) is a probability space,
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(3)  is a sub -algebra,
(4)  

	
 R is -measurableis the set of player i's
strategies, and
(5)  R

 R is player i's -measurable payoff function which is denoted
by 		
We consider as the set of states. Condition 3 of Definition 1 means that the-algebra
 is player i's knowledge and the probability measure  is the common prior.
As usual, we consider the conditional probability 
	as player i's subjective
probability in this model. To simplify notations we define the subjective expected
utility function 



 R , which is described as 
							,
where = 
	. The measurability of condition 4 describes that each player can
choose a strategy which he or she knows.
DEFINITION 2 : A TU-game is characterized by a system 	, where
(1) is the set of players, and
(2) 	 R is called a characteristic function.
We shall let the subscripts in small letters to denote individual players, and the sub-
scripts in capital letters to denote coalitions. As usual, let 
	
be the strategies of a coalition S and  
 	 be the
strategies of the complementary coalition . According to Ichiishi (1997), we intro-
duce some behavior rules in this TU-game using an incomplete information game.
The characteristic function 
 

	 R is called an α-fashion in TU-games, if

	






	 








		,
where 

	is the best punishment to 

.
A TU-game derived from an incomplete information game is defined as 	
	
for all 	.
DEFINITION 3 : The 
-core of the TU-game
	is the set of utility vector 

 R
satisfying
(1) 


	, and
(2) 


	for all 

	
― ―94
In this paper we prove the non-emptiness of the -core in the TU-game which is
derived from an incomplete information game.
3. Results
PROPOSITION 1 : Let  be an incomplete information game. If
 

 is convex and weakly compact, and  is concave on R

and
integrably bounded function, then an -core in the TU-game 	is nonempty.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1 : 



	 R is a concave and continuous function.
concavity
For all and in 


and for all 
,



 is concave
 

.
continuity
Noting that is continuous on the interior of its domain because of the concavity
of on R
. Suppose that → in 


. Since ess sup,
it follows that 	almost all . This implies that 	
almost all . Using the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain the continuity of

. In fact,
	

	

	

	

	
	  (DCT)
 (
 is continuous)
 
.
Step 2 : 
		for all 


and all balanced collection 
Before proving, it is convenient to introduce the following balanced collection. Let
be a collection of coalitions. For each 
, 
 
 
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denotes the set of these coalitions of which i is a member. If there is nonnegative
number  for all  such that for all   is called a balanced
collection. It has been known by Bondareva-Shapley that the non-emptiness of the
core in TU-games is equivalent to the balanced condition, that is 
for all 	
and all balanced collection .
It follows that		
	

	
is lower semi-continuous, since is weakly
compact and  is a continuous function. For this reason,  is well defined.
Noting that 
 is given by 	



	

, where 

	

 is the best
punishment to 	

, we check the balanced condition of Bondareva-Shapley.
Since 

 is the best punishment to 	

, we obtain for all 



 



	



	


 



	


Using the concavity of , we obtain that




	






	







	


 	
	





	
.
Then we can conclude from Bondareva-Shapley's theorem that the 
-core is nonempty.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have established the existence of an 
-core of an incomplete information game.
The non-emptiness of an 
-core requires (1) a payoff. function is concave, and (2)
player i's strategy is -measurable, and its set is convex and weakly compact. This
result may be considered as an asymmetric information version of Scarf (1971) and
Zhao (1999a). Our future topic is to prove the existence of β-core of an incomplete
information game.
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―Abstract ―
We prove an existence of an -core derived from an incomplete information game
in which each player has different information. These results can be considered as
an asymmetric information version of Zhao (1999a).
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